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THE FCC’S NEW POWER TO ADJUDICATE 
INTERCONNECTION DISPUTES: “JUST AND REASONABLE” 
SHOULD MEAN “BILL-AND-KEEP” 
BY ERIK ESTRADA
†
 AND KARIN ROSS
*
 
Effective policy initiatives solve problems and do not create more 
of them.
1
 On February 4, 2015, Thomas Wheeler, Chairman of the Fed-
eral Communications Commission (FCC), released his proposed rules 
regarding the Open Internet and Net Neutrality in an op-ed published in 
Wired Magazine.
2
 A fact sheet released by the FCC on the same day ac-
companied this op-ed (Fact Sheet).
3
 This Fact Sheet noted that the FCC, 
for the first time, will have the power to adjudicate interconnection dis-
putes between internet service providers (ISPs) and “edge providers” 
(e.g., content providers) if such ISPs are not acting in a “just and reason-
able” manner.
4
 ISPs, such as Comcast or Verizon, provide access to the 
Internet by connecting users to their networks. Interconnection refers to 
the physical linking of one carrier’s network with the equipment and 
facilities of another “for the mutual exchange of traffic.”
5
 Interconnec-
tion is a significant issue for the FCC because an ISP can control the 
Internet content that reaches its customers. If a customer of an ISP wants 
certain Internet content, but the ISP has elected not to deliver such con-
tent, either through its network or by not allowing it through its intercon-
nection points with the rest of the Internet, then the customer will not be 
able to view the desired content without changing ISPs. If a customer 
only has one ISP provider (the case for about 75% of U.S. households at 
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 1. The views reflected in this note are those of the authors, however, the authors 
acknowledge the inherent conflict of interest that exists in addressing a topic that may impact their 
employer. In the interest of full disclosure, it is publicly known that Netflix is a customer of Level 3. 
 2. See Tom Wheeler, This Is How We Will Ensure Net Neutrality, WIRED MAGAZINE (Feb. 
4, 2015), http://www.wired.com/2015/02/fcc-chairman-wheeler-net-neutrality/.  
 3. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Chairman Wheeler Proposes New Rules for 
Protecting the Open Internet, FCC FACT SHEET, (Feb. 4, 2015), 
http://www.fcc.gov/document/chairman-wheeler-proposes-new-rules-protecting-open-internet. 
 4. See id. Because the FCC is comprised of three Democrats and two Republicans, it is likely 
that Chairman Wheeler’s proposed rules will be adopted when the Commission meets on February 
26, 2015. See generally FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Commissioners from 1934 to 
Present, FCC LEADERSHIP, http://www.fcc.gov/leadership/commissioners-1934-present (last visited 
Feb. 15, 2015) (identifying past FCC Commissioners and the party affiliation of each); Cf. FEDERAL 
COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, Open Meetings, FCC EVENTS, http://www.fcc.gov/open-meetings 
(last visited Feb. 15, 2015) (providing a schedule of public meetings).   
 5. 47 C.F.R. § 51.5 (2014). 
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25 Mbps of capacity), then this customer is out of options.
6
 Given the 
importance of interconnection, the power to adjudicate interconnection 
disputes is a positive policy change for the FCC and one that, if correctly 
implemented, will further the policy goals of both equity and efficiency.
7
 
Accordingly, the FCC should provide both ISPs and edge providers with 
additional guidance related to this just and reasonable standard. Such 
additional guidance will help to ensure that this general conduct standard 
is both implemented and administered fairly and efficiently amongst 
ISPs and edge providers, which in turn, will help avoid future interpreta-
tion problems related to this standard. 
The Fact Sheet related to Chairman Wheeler’s proposed rules notes 
that the FCC’s power to adjudicate interconnection disputes is derived 
from Title II of the Communications Act of 1934 (Title II) and Section 
706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 (Section 706).
8
 Title II gov-
erns the regulation of “common carriers,” and imposes upon them a ro-
bust set of obligations.
9
 Notably, under Title II, the FCC “may prescribe 
such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public interest.”
10
 
Section 706 relates to broadband and gives the FCC authority to “pro-
mote competition in the local telecommunications market,” and “remove 
barriers to infrastructure investment.”
11
 Based on the foregoing authority, 
the Fact Sheet states: “For the first time the Commission would have 
authority to hear complaints and take appropriate enforcement action if 
necessary, if it determines the interconnection activities of ISPs are not 
just and reasonable, thus allowing it to address issues that may arise in 
the exchange of traffic between mass-market broadband providers and 
edge providers.”
12
 Chairman Wheeler wants the FCC to enforce this just 
and reasonable standard on a case-by-case basis.
13
 The FCC’s overarch-
  
 6. See Zach Epstein, Almost One-Third of U.S. Households Have No Choice For Broadband 
Internet Service, BGR (March 14, 2014, 8:45 AM), http://bgr.com/2014/03/14/home-internet-
service-competition-lacking/; see also FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, The Facts and 
Future of Broadband Competition, PREPARED REMARKS OF FCC CHAIRMAN TOM WHEELER, (Sep. 
4, 2014) at 2, Table 1, https://apps.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-329161A1.pdf; see also 
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, FCC Finds U.S. Broadband Deployment Not Keeping 
Pace, FCC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2015) at 1, 
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2015/db0129/DOC-331760A1.pdf (“[T]he 
FCC updated its broadband benchmark speeds to 25 megabits per second (Mbps) for downloads and 
3 Mbps for uploads.”).  
 7. See DEBORAH STONE, POLICY PARADOX: THE ART OF POLITICAL DECISION MAKING 84 
(3rd ed. 2011). 
 8. See source cited supra note 5. 
 9. 47 U.S.C. § 201 (2014). 
 10. Id.  
 11. 47 U.S.C. § 1302 (2014). 
 12. See source cited supra note 5 (emphasis added). 
 13. Christopher W. Savage, Michael C. Sloan, and Paul B. Hudson, FCC Releases Outline of 
Net Neutrality Rules Schedules for February 26 Vote, DAVIS WRIGHT TREMAINE LLP ADVISORIES 
& BLOGS, (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.dwt.com/FCC-Releases-Outline-of-Net-Neutrality-Rules-
Scheduled-for-February-26-Vote-02-05-2015/; see Anne L. Kim, Net Neutrality: Reaction and 
Waiting for Details, ROLL CALL (Feb. 4, 2015, 5:39 PM), http://blogs.rollcall.com/technocrat/net-
neutrality-reaction-and-waiting-for-details/?dcz=. 
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ing goals with respect to this case-by-case approach will be to “protect 
consumers, competition, free expression, and innovation.”
14
 
The FCC’s power to adjudicate interconnection disputes is positive 
policy change for the Commission because it will allow the FCC to mon-
itor the activities of ISPs. ISPs sell consumers access to all of the content 
on the Internet, however, ISPs do not have access to all of that Internet 
content. Consequently, ISPs can only honor the foregoing promise by 
interconnecting with other providers. While interconnection is a signifi-
cant issue, opponents of this change in position by the FCC argue that the 
market can address interconnection activities on its own.
15
 In fact, this 
“invisible hand” reasoning may explain why Chairman Wheeler’s pro-
posed rules did not initially address interconnection disputes.
16
 Oppo-
nents, for instance, reference the agreement between Netflix and Com-
cast as evidence of the free market working. In 2014, Netflix entered into 
an interconnection deal directly with Comcast to better ensure that its 
content would reach its subscribers, and that such content would be de-
livered without latency.
17
 When addressing this deal, Netflix’s CEO stat-
ed, “Without strong net neutrality, big ISPs can demand potentially esca-
lating fees for the interconnection required to deliver high quality ser-
vice.”
18
 He further explained, “[t]he big ISPs can make these demands—
driving up costs and prices for everyone else—because of their market 
position.”
19
 This dynamic between ISPs and edge providers demonstrates 
the problem that Chairman Wheeler is trying to solve by addressing in-
terconnection activities, namely that blocking and discrimination can 
occur at the point of interconnection. Thus, in Chairman Wheeler’s final 
draft, he noted that the FCC will have the power to adjudicate intercon-
nection disputes.
20
 The FCC needs to monitor interconnection activities 
in order for it to obtain its overarching Net Neutrality goals of “no block-
ing,” “no throttling,” and “no paid prioritization.”
21
 Accordingly, if most 
of the nearly 4 million people who commented on the FCC’s proposed 
Net Neutrality rules desire the same vision for the Internet, then the 
  
 14. TELECOMMUNICATIONS REPORTS INTERNATIONAL, INC., Internet Interconnection to be 
Title II Service Under Draft Order, TR’S STATE NEWSWIRE (Feb. 4, 2015), 
http://www.tr.com/insight2/content/2015/in020415/in020415.htm.  
 15. See FCC Leaning Toward Case-by-Case Net Neutrality Interconnection Tack, 
WASHINGTON INTERNET DAILY, (Jan. 28, 2015) available at 2015 WLNR 3026454. 
 16. Chairman Wheeler Releases His Network Neutrality Plan (with a Few Surprises), 
COOLEY LLP CLIENT ALERT (Feb. 4, 2015), www.cooley.com/70855. 
 17. Edward Wyatt and Noam Cohen, Comcast and Netflix Reach Deal on Service, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 23, 2014, at http://nyti.ms/1fLrKx8.  
 18. Reed Hastings, Internet Tolls and the Case for Strong Net Neutrality, NETFLIX BLOG 
(March 20, 2014, 2:00 PM), http://blog.netflix.com/2014/03/internet-tolls-and-case-for-strong-
net.html. 
 19. Id.  
 20. See source cited supra note 5. 
 21. Id. 
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FCC’s power to adjudicate interconnection disputes is a positive policy 
change for the Commission.
22
   
While the FCC’s power to adjudicate interconnection disputes is a 
positive policy change for the Commission, the FCC needs to provide 
ISPs, edge providers, and others, such as attorneys representing these 
entities, with additional guidance related to the just and reasonable 
standard. Such additional guidance will help to ensure that this general 
conduct standard is implemented and administered equitably and effi-
ciently across the Internet. With most policy debates, there is a trade-off 
between equity and efficiency.
23
 Here, however, the FCC is in a unique 
position to further both policy goals by simply providing additional guid-
ance related to this just and reasonable standard. In fact, the case-by-case 
approach proposed by Chairman Wheeler related to this general conduct 
standard is generally opposed by both proponents and opponents of his 
set of rules.
24
 Instead of dealing with interconnection disputes solely on a 
case-by-case basis, the FCC should promulgate additional rules or guide-
lines that address what this just and reasonable standard actually means. 
Administrative agencies frequently promulgate additional guidance after 
a particular rule is adopted. Similarly, here, the FCC should provide ad-
ditional guidance related to this general conduct standard so that ISPs, 
edge providers, and others may have more certainty with respect to 
whether their interconnection activities are just and reasonable. 
In the past, the FCC has promulgated additional guidance for its 
standards, such as the standard of “reasonable network management,” 
because such guidance provides greater clarity for ISPs and edge provid-
ers with respect to the intent of such standards.
25
 For example, the FCC 
in its 2010 Open Internet Order adopted the “reasonable network man-
agement” standard, and then provided a definition for such standard: “A 
network management practice is reasonable if it is appropriate and tai-
lored to achieving a legitimate network management purpose, taking into 
account the particular network architecture and technology of the broad-
band Internet access service.”
26
 Similarly, here, the FCC should provide 
greater clarity regarding the just and reasonable standard.
27
 For example, 
  
 22. See source cited supra note 4. 
 23. See source cited supra note 9. 
 24. See source cited supra note 15. 
 25. See Report and Order: In the Matter of Preserving the Open Internet Broadband Industry 
Practices, 10-201 FCC Rcd 17905 (2010) (“Legitimate network management purposes include: 
ensuring network security and integrity, including by addressing traffic that is harmful to the net-
work; addressing traffic that is unwanted by end users (including by premise operators), such as by 
providing services or capabilities consistent with an end user’s choices regarding parental controls or 
security capabilities; and reducing or mitigating the effects of congestion on the network. The term 
‘particular network architecture and technology’ refers to the differences across access platforms 
such as cable, DSL, satellite, and fixed wireless.” Id. at 17952 (citations omitted)). 
 26. See id. at 17952 (emphasis added). 
 27. MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. F.C.C., 675 F.2d 408, 414 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Implementation is 
as critical to a policy’s success as theoretical design.”). 
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in MCI Telecomm. Corp. v. FCC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia, when addressing just and reasonable, asserted: “[a] 
basic principle used to ensure that rates are ‘just and reasonable’ is that 
rates are determined on the basis of cost.” Accordingly, if just and rea-
sonable rates are rooted in actual costs, then the FCC should adopt a 
“bill-and-keep” cost structure in which ISPs would recover their network 
and interconnection costs from their customers, and edge providers 
would recover their network and interconnection costs from their sub-
scribers.
28
 Put simply, these network and interconnection costs represent 
part of the actual costs of doing business for ISPs and edge providers, 
respectively. A bill-and-keep structure will also help ISPs avoid the in-
herent conflict of interest that exists when delivering both their own con-
tent, such as Comcast delivering content from NBC Universal, and the 
content of other edge providers.
 29
 Moreover, the FCC is moving toward 
a bill-and-keep framework.
30
 For these reasons, the FCC should assert 
that a just and reasonable practice related to interconnection activities is 
one that is based on a bill-and-keep cost structure. 
Chairman Wheeler wants the FCC to have the power to adjudicate 
interconnection disputes, which signals a major change in policy that has 
the unique opportunity to further the policy goals of both equity and effi-
ciency. However, additional guidance from the FCC is essential for 
proper implementation. The Fact Sheet provides that the Commission 
will have the authority to determine whether interconnection activities of 
ISPs are just and reasonable. Additional guidance related to this general 
conduct standard will give ISPs, edge providers, and others more clarity 
with respect to their interconnection activities. Defining this standard in 
terms of a bill-and-keep framework, which the FCC is already moving 








 28. See Declaratory Ruling: In the Matter of Connect America Fund Developing a Unified 
Intercarrier Compensation Regime 26 FCC Rcd 17934 (Feb. 11, 2015) at note 22 (“[u]nder a bill-
and-keep regime, ‘carriers look first to their subscribers to cover the costs of the network, then to 
explicit universal service support where necessary.’); see also In the Matter of Connect America 
Fund, 26 FCC Rcd 17663, 2011 WL 5844975, at *13 (Nov. 18, 2011). 
 29. See 10-201 FCC Rcd 17905, 17915 (2010) (“[B]roadband providers may have economic 
incentives to block or otherwise disadvantage specific edge providers or classes of edge providers, 
for example by controlling the transmission of network traffic over a broadband connection, includ-
ing the price and quality of access to end users. A broadband provider might use this power to bene-
fit its own or affiliated offerings at the expense of unaffiliated offerings.” Id. (citations omitted)).  
 30. See 26 FCC Rcd at 17676 (“[T]he Commission is in the process of transitioning to a 
default bill-and-keep framework where carriers look to their end users to cover the costs of the 
network.” Id. at *13(citation omitted)).  
 31. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. 
